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FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
BY EDWARD S. STIMSON
I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign power is territorial.1 There are, of course, excep-
tions. A sovereignty may exercise its power on the high seas out-
side the territory of any nation; for example, on board ships fly-
ing its flag, and piracy is justiciable in any sovereignty.2 On land
the chief exception is the power which a sovereignty has over its
citizens who are abroad. 3 In Anglo-American law a sovereignty
has no legislative, executive, or judicial power over property or
non-nationals within the territory of another sovereignty. With
the above exceptions its power is limited to persons and property
within its own territory.
Sometimes it is said that a sovereignty's power is limited to
persons, property, and acts within its own territory. Can power
or jurisdiction depend upon an act?
The basis of jurisdiction is physical power.4 It cannot be said
that a sovereignty has physical power, sway, or control over an
act. A sovereignty cannot act upon or deal with an act. It can-
not impound or destroy an act. It can only affect an act indi-
rectly through its power over the actor. It would seem then that
whether or not a sovereignty's law applied to a particular act
would depend upon the location of the actor at the time he per-
formed the act and not upon the location of the act.
Laying aside the possibility that jurisdiction may depend upon
an act, suppose we apply to foreign corporations the principle
that a sovereignty's power is limited to persons and property
within its territory. The difficulty in applying the territorial
principle to corporations arises from the fact that corporations
are intangible. 5 Being intangible a corporation can have no lo-
IStory on Conflict of Laws 8th Ed. (1883) sec. 18.
2 1 Oppenheim's International Law 4th Ed. (1928) sec. 146.
3 1 Oppenheim's International Law 4th Ed. (1928) sec. 145.
4 McDonald v. Mabee (1916) 243 U. S. 90, 91.
5 Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert (C. C. A. 2, 1930) 45 F. (2d) 139; Noel
Construction Co. v. Smith & Co. (C. C. Md. 1911) 193 F. 492, 495; Farmer's &
Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1922) 286 F. 566,
569; Wood v. The Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (1839) 13 Conn. 201, 208;
Friend & Co. v. Goldsmith (1923) 307 Ill. 45, 50, 138 N. E. 185, 187.
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cation in space. It is not present anywhere. Jurisdiction over
it cannot depend upon its physical presence or location in any par-
ticular place. How then are we to apply a territorial principle of
jurisdiction to that which can have no geographical situs?
The solution of this problem would seem to lie in centering at-
tention upon the human representatives of the corporation in-
stead of the intangible entity. Application of the general prin-
ciple of jurisdiction would produce the following rule: A foreign
corporation is subject to a sovereignty's jurisdiction whenever
one or more of its human representatives is within that sover-
eignty's territory.
What persons should be considered representative? Should
jurisdiction over foreign corporations be determined by the pres-
ence of stockholders, directors, agents or servants? Do some or
all of these persons represent the corporation?
The acts of stockholders are not representative at all except
perhaps while in attendance at stockholder's meetings for the pur-
pose of voting upon some corporate transaction requiring their
approval. This is because the corporation is an entity separate
and distinct from its stockholders and they have no power to rep-
resent or act for it.
The acts of directors likewise are non-representative except at
directors' meetings. Since at such times they are agents of the
corporation, they may be regarded as included in the term agent.
The acts of agents or servants are not always representative.
At times they may act in their capacity as agents or servants. At
other times they may act for themselves or for another principal
or master. It is only when acting within the scope of their au-
thority on behalf of the corporation that their physical presence
can be said to represent the corporate entity. A sovereignty does
not acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corporation by reason of
the presence of an officer or agent who is not acting or doing busi-
ness for it. s
6 Newell v. The Great Western Railway Co. (1869) 19 Mich. 336; St. Clair
v. Cox (1882) 106 U. S. 350; Kendall v. American Automatic Loom Co. (1904)
198 U. S. 477; Lumiere v. Wilder Inc. (1922) 261 U. S. 174; Rust v. United
Water Works Co. Ltd. (C. C. A. 8, 1895) 70 F. 129; Reifsnider v. American
Imp. Pub. Co. (C. C. Minn. 1891) 45 F. 433; Bentlif v. London & Colonial
Finance Corp. Ltd. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1890) 44 F. 667; St. Louis Wire Mill Co.
v. Consolidated Barb-Wire Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1887) 32 F. 802. Due process
requires this result. Riverside Mills v. Menefee (1914) 237 U. S. 189. In
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Having considered what classes of persons represent the cor-
poration, the suggested rule may be given a more definite form as
follows: A foreign corporation is subject to a sovereignty's jur-
isdiction whenever one or more of its agents or servants, acting in
its behalf, is within that sovereignty's territory.7
The purpose of this paper is to offer this rule as a solution of the
problem of jurisdiction over foreign corporations. The remain-
ing pages are devoted to an examination of the decisions of the
federal courts. These are classified and scrutinized with a view
to determining whether or not the proposed rule is applicable.
II. DOCTRINES OF THE SUPREME COURT
1. EARLY CASES.
The first case to come before the United States Supreme Court
in which it was necessary to decide whether or not a state had jur-
isdiction over a foreign corporation was Lafayette Inurance Co.
Goldey v. Morning News (1894) 156 U. S. 518, service was on the president
while "temporarily" in the state. In Moulin v. Insurance Co. (1853) 24 N. J.
Law 222 service was on the president while "accidentally" within the state.
Whether or not the president was acting for the corporation while in the state
does not appear in either case.
Service on an agent or servant who is not acting or doing business for the
corporation will be valid if the sovereignty has jurisdiction by reason of the
presence of other agents or servants acting or doing business for it. Penn-
sylvania Lumberman's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer (1905) 197 U. S.
407; Cone v. Tuscaloosa Mfg. Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1896) 76 F. 891.
7 See Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who
Carry on Business Within the Territory, (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 676, 684,
688, 695. Cf. Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank (1923)
261 U. S. 171, criticised in comment (1925) 20 Ill. L. Rev. 281, 284.
The rule should be used only in determining whether or not a sovereignty has
power. A state may not have exercised its power. Thus a Colorado statute
providing for service upon foreign corporations applied only to those having
an office in the state. Cooper Mfg. Co. v. Ferguson (1885) 113 U. S. 727.
Many statutes providing for service upon foreign corporations provide for
service upon certain designated officers. These have been interpreted as
prohibiting service upon other agents and servants of the corporation. The
service is invalid because service upon an agent or servant of that class is
prohibited by the statute. Boardman v. S. S. McClure Co. (C. C. Minn. 1903)
123 F. 614 (traveling advertising solicitor not a "managing agent"); Doe v.
Springfield Boiler & Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1900) 104 F. 684 (commission
broker not a "business agent"); Frankel v. Dover Mfg. Co. (Sup. Ct., App.
Div., 1907) 104 N. Y. S. 459 (salesman not a "managing agent"); Higgs v.
Sperry (1905) 139 N. C. 299, 51 S. E. 1020 (traveling auditor not a "local
agent"). The state has not exercised its full power.
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v. French.8 An insurance company incorporated in Indiana had
a local agent in Cincinnati. The agent issued a policy to resi-
dents of Ohio insuring Ohio property against fire. The corpora-
tion was sued on the policy in a state court in Ohio, process being
served on the agent pursuant to an Ohio statute. A judgment
was entered against the corporation. The judgment was sued
on in the United States Circuit Court in Indiana, where a judg-
ment was entered against the corporation on the ground that the
Ohio judgment was entitled to full faith and credit. The question
was whether Ohio had jurisdiction or power over the Indiana cor-
poration. The Supreme Court held that it had.
The opinion first reaffirms Chief Justice Taney's dictum in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle that "a corporation can have no legal
existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is
created. It exists only in contemplation of law, and by force of
the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer
obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell
in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sover-
eignty." 9 Justice Curtis then stated that the corporation could
have entered an appearance in the Ohio suit. He then made this
astonishing statement: "The inquiry is not whether the defend-
ant was personally within the state but whether he or some one
authorized to act for him in reference to the suit had notice and
appeared; or if he did not appear, whether he was bound to appear
or suffer a judgment by default."'1  It would seem that whether
or not the corporation was "bound to appear" would depend upon
whether it was personally within the state and the real question
would become when is a corporation "personally" within a state.
Taney's dictum prevented this analysis. The court's statement
as well as the entire opinion seems to be the result of a desire to
reach a result logically prohibited by Taney's dictum without dis-
turbing what, though mere obiter, was regarded as law.
Justice Curtis recognized that no appearance had been entered.
He said that the corporation was "bound to appear" because
Ohio's consent to the transaction of business in its territory was
conditioned on the assent of the corporation to Ohio's jurisdiction.
8 (1855) 18 How. 404.
9 (1839) 13 Pet. 519, 588. See Henderson, The Position of Foreign Cor-
porations in American Constitutional Law (1918) Ch. II.
10 (1855) 18 How. 404, 407.
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There are two fallacies in this reasoning. One is that it assumes
that Ohio could impose any sort of condition, even one subjecting
to its jurisdiction persons who never came within its borders.
The Supreme Court subsequently adopted the doctrine that a state
could not impose unconstitutional conditions upon a foreign cor-
poration as the price of its permission to transact business within
its territory." Neither can it impose conditions which are con-
trary to the basic principle of jurisdiction. A sovereignty or
state except for its own citizens has no power over persons located
outside of its own territory. It cannot give itself power over such
persons by enacting a statute imposing a condition. It cannot lift
itself by its own boot straps. Having no power the statute has
no application beyond its own boundaries. 12 The basic principle
of jurisdiction is a principle of international law. It is funda-
mental law. Statutes are invalid in so far as they are contrary
to it. If a sovereignty could extend its power by statute, all jur-
isdictional limitations would soon disappear.
The other fallacy lies in the notion that Ohio obtained jurisdic-
tion by the consent of the foreign corporation. There was
neither actual nor implied consent. The corporation had no
actual intention of subjecting itself to Ohio's jurisdiction.
Neither can the doing of business in Ohio be said to manifest such
an intention. To be sure the doing of business in Ohio was a vol-
untary act, but as the condition was one which Ohio could not im-
pose, consent to the condition cannot be implied from the doing
of the act. Attributing consent to the corporation is a mere fic-
tion indulged in by the court for the purpose of accomplishing the
desired result.
I1 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas (1910) 216 U. S. 1; Pullman Co.
v. Kansas (1910) 216 U. S. 56; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
(1910) 216 U. S. 146. See Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations
in American Constitutional Law (1918) Ch. VIII.
12 In Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (1894) A. C. 670, 683 the
Earl of Selborne said, "All jurisdiction is properly territorial, and 'extra ter-
ritorium jus dicenti, impune non paretur'. Territorial jurisdiction attaches
(with special exceptions) upon all persons either permanently or temporarily
resident within the territory while they are within it; but it does not follow
them after they have withdrawn from it, and when they are living in another
independent country. . . . As between different provinces under one sov-
ereignty . . . the legislation of the sovereign may distribute and regulatejurisdiction; but no territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any
foreign court ought to recognize against foreigners, who owe no allegiance or
obedience to the power which so legislates."
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This consent doctrine is stated by Justice Curtis in the follow-
ing language: "Now when this corporation sent its agent into
Ohio, with authority to make contracts of insurance there, the
corporation must be taken to assent to the condition upon which
alone such business could be there transacted by them."'13 The
act which was held to amount to consent was not the doing of busi-
ness, but doing it through an agent located in Ohio. Thus the test
of jurisdiction presented by the case is the presence of an agent
acting for the corporation.
The next case to come before the United States Supreme Court
was St. Clair v. Cox14 decided twenty-seven years later. In this
case the exclusion of a certified copy of a judgment which the de-
fendant had offered in evidence was assigned as error. The j udg-
ment had been obtained in a Michigan court against an Illinois
corporation. The sheriff's return recited that the writ had been
served "by delivering the same to Henry J. Colwell, Esq., agent of
the said Winthrop Mining Company, personally, in said county."
The trial court's refusal to admit the certified copy of the judg-
ment in evidence was sustained on the ground that it did not ap-
pear that the agent was acting in his representative capacity, that
is for the corporation while he was in Michigan. In this connec-
tion the court said, " . . . service upon an agent of a foreign
corporation will not be deemed sufficient, unless he represents the
corporation in the state. This representation implies that the
corporation does business, or has business in the state for the
transaction of which it sends or appoints an agent there. If the
agent occupies no representative character with respect to the
business of the corporation in the state, a judgment rendered up-
on service on him would hardly be considered in other tribunals as
possessing any probative force." 15
This case was followed by Soci~tg Fonci~re v. Milliken.O A
corporation organized under the laws of France for the purpose of
developing real estate in Texas was sued in Texas. Process was
served upon an agent who had charge of its affairs in Texas. The
Supreme Court held that the service was valid. Justice Brewer
in his opinion relied on Angerhoefer v. Bradstreet Co.1 7 decided
by the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Texas. That
18 (1855) 18 How. 404, 408. 26 (1890) 135 U. S. 304.
14 (1882) 106 U. S. 350. 17 (C. C. E. D. Tex. 1884) 22 F. 305.
15 (1882) 106 U. S. 350, 359.
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court per Sabin, J. said, "Service upon a corporation which is
present, although not a citizen or resident of the state or county,
if made upon the local agent representing such company in the
county where the suit is brought, the company is present in the
agent and service upon the agent is personal service on the com-
pany. The company may be a non-resident of the county or state,
yet if it comes into a county or state and establishes a local agent
for the transaction of its business, it is there present for all the
purposes of its business and for all purposes of suit."' 8
The subsequent cases of Goldey v. Morning News' 9 and Conley
v. Mathieson Alkali Works20 were like St. Clair v. Cox. In them
as in St. Clair v. Cox the phrase "doing business" was used in con-
nection with the agent for the purpose of determining whether or
not he was representing the corporation at the time of service.
Later cases relying on these seized upon the phrase "doing busi-
ness" as the test of jurisdiction.21 Thus, the idea that jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations depended upon the presence of
agents representing the corporation was obscured.
2. THE CONSENT DOCTRINE
The fallacies of the consent doctrine were exposed in connection
with the discussion of Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, supra.
No attempt will be made here to trace the doctrine through the
cases. That work has already been well done by others.2 2 There
is one type of case, however, where it cannot be said that the con-
sent of the corporation is a mere fiction. Where a statute re-
quires that foreign corporations before doing business in the state
shall appoint an agent in the state to receive service of process
and the corporation actually appoints such an agent it would seem
that the corporation actually consents to submit itself to the
state's jurisdiction. In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold
19 Italics the author's.
19 (1894) 156 U. S. 518.
20 (1903) 190 U. S. 406.
21 Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley (1898) 172 U. S. 603,
610; Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v. Phelps (1903) 190 U. S. 147,
157.
22 See Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Con-
stitutional Law (1918) Ch. V; Scott, Business Jurisdiction over Nonresi-
dents, (1919) 32 Harv. Law Rev. 872, 879; Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations, (1917) 30 Harv. Law Rev. 676, 692.
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Issue Mining Co.,23 Justice Holmes recognized that in the usual
case where the foreign corporation has not complied with the
statute consent was a mere fiction. However, he held that where
the service was upon an agent "voluntarily" appointed by the cor-
poration to receive such service the consent was actual so as to
subject it to the state's jurisdiction upon a foreign cause of action.
He distinguished the cases where the Supreme Court reached the
opposite result, Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. Mc-
Donough24 and Simon v. Southern Railway Co.,2 5 on the ground
that there was no actual consent in those cases.
This jurisdiction by actual consent is seemingly analogous to
the jurisdiction obtained by actual consent where there has been
an entry of appearance. There is, however, an important dif-
ference between the two. An entry of appearance is a voluntary
act. The appointment of an agent to receive service of process
is not voluntary. It is induced by the belief that the state has
power to require it. As has already been pointed out, a state has
no power to enact a statute imposing a condition which will give
it power over persons who never come into its territory. The
consent is conditioned on the states power to require it and can
have no effect when that power does not exist. In three recent
cases the United States Supreme Court has held that such consent
does not subject the foreign corporation to the state's jurisdiction
when no business is done within the state.20 It is difficult to see
how the consent doctrine can flourish after these decisions.27
23 (1917) 243 U. S. 93.
24 (1907) 204 U. S. 8.
25 (1915) 236 U. S. 115.
26 Chipman Ltd. v. Jeffery Co. (1920) 251 U. S. 373; Mitchell Furniture Co.
v. Selden Breck Co. (1921) 257 U. S. 213; Morris & Co. v. Skandinavia Insur-
ance Co. (1929) 279 U. S. 405.
27 In Hess v. Pawlowski (1927) 274 U. S. 352, the United States Supreme
Court applied the doctrine to individuals. A Massachusetts statute provided
that the operation of an automobile in the state by a non-resident should be
deemed equivalent to the appointment by him of the registrar as his agent
upon whom process might be served in causes of action arising out of its op-
eration in the state. The statute required the plaintiff to send a copy of the
process to the defendant by registered mail. Hess, a non-resident, who was
not in Massachusetts at the time suit was filed was served in the manner re-
quired by the statute. The Supreme Court sustained the jurisdiction of
Massachusetts and the validity of the statute. Justice Butler reasoned that
the regulation of the use of the highways was a valid exercise of the police
power, that Massachusetts could exclude individuals until they complied with
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss3/2
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3. THE PRESENCE DOCTRINE
The theory of the presence doctrine is that the foreign corpora-
tion is actually present where it is doing business. It is subject
to the jurisdiction of every sovereignty within whose territory it
does business because it is "present" there. This doctrine first
appeared in a case decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
185328 prior to the Supreme Court's adoption of the consent doc-
trine in Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French. The first United
States Supreme Court decision in which it appears is St. Louis
Southwestern Railway v. Alexander 29 decided in 1913. Subse-
quent decisions of the same court adopt it.30
the statute and "having no power to exclude the state may declare that the
use of the highway by the non-resident is the equivalent of the appointment
of the registrar as the agent on whom process may be served."
This is the old argument repeatedly condemned by the United States Su-
preme Court itself that the state having the power to exclude may impose any
condition as the price of its permission to enter. Furthermore the defendant
did not actually consent to the state's jurisdiction. The consent is implied.
It is fictitious. The court relied on Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, supra
and Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., supra.
Justice Butler also relied on Kane v. New Jersey, (1916) 242 U. S. 160,
where a New Jersey statute providing that non-residents operating an auto-
mobile in the state must appoint the Secretary of State as their agent to re-
ceive service of process in causes of action arising out of its operation in the
state was upheld. The defendant in that case was arrested while actually in
the state. The state clearly had power or jurisdiction over him. The statute
was held to be a reasonable exercise of the police power and not contrary to
the equal protection of the laws clause because not discriminatory and there-
fore constitutional. The question of jurisdiction over non-residents not with-
in the state when served was not discussed.
The decision is sound not because of the reasons given in support of it, but
because Hess was in Massachusetts territory at the time of the accident and
therefore subject to its laws. The statute applied to him and he was bound
by it. Had Hess never gone into Massachusetts, jurisdiction over him could
not have been acquired by a statute providing for service on an agent. Flex-
ner v. Farson (1919) 248 U. S. 289.
The case is in accord with the cases sustaining jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation acquired by service pursuant to a state statute specifically pro-
viding that foreign corporations doing business in the state are subject to
suit on causes of action arising there after the corporation has ceased to do
business there. See note 45b post.2 8 Moulin v. Trenton Mutual Life and Fire Insurance Co. (1855) 25 N. J. L.
57. Same case (1853) 24 N. J. L. (4 Zabr.) 222.
29 (1913) 227 U. S. 218, 226.
so People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 79, 84,
87; Bank of America v. Whitney Bank (1923) 261 U. S. 171, 173; Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co. v. Chatters (1928) 279 U. S. 320, 324.
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4. FOREIGN CAUSES OF ACTION
If the sovereignty has jurisdiction over the foreign corporation
there is no reason why suit may not be brought against it on
transitory causes of action no matter where they arise. In this
respect a corporation is not different from an individual. Many
cases so hold.31 However, the position of the United States Su-
preme Court on this question is not at all clear.
In Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane3 2 suit to recover for a per-
sonal injury alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff while on
board a lighter off the coast of Ireland was brought in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York
against a British corporation. The court held that the Circuit
Court had jurisdiction over the foreign corporation because it was
"doing business" in the District and that the cause of action
"might be maintained in any Circuit Court of the United States
which acquired jurisdiction of the defendant."
In Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough3 3 and Simon v. South-
ern Railway Co.3 4 foreign corporations had not complied with a
state statute authorizing foreign corporations to do business in
the state but were nevertheless engaging in business there. They
were sued there on foreign causes of action. Process was served
on a state official designated by the statute. The court held that
in the absence of consent the state had jurisdiction only as to
causes of action arising therein for the reason that consent to be
subject to the state's jurisdiction could be implied only to that
extent. 35
In Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co. 30
3 1 Johnston v. Trade Insurance Co. (1882) 132 Mass. 432; Logan v. Bank
of Scotland (1904) 2 K. B. 495; Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane (1898) 170
U. S. 100; Owen v. Power Co. (1916) 78 W. Va. 596, 89 S. E. 262; Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co. (1917) 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915; Massachusetts
Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Concrete Steel Bridge Co. (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 37
F. (2d) 695; Haggin v. Comptoir D'Escompte de Paris (1904) 23 Q. B. D.
519; La Bourgogne (1899) A. C. 321.
32 (1898) 170 U. S. 100.
33 (1907) 204 U. S. 8.
34 (1915) 236 U. S. 115.
35 Dicta to the same effect as the court's holding in the Old Wayne and
Simon cases may be found in subsequent decisions. Morris & Co. v. Skandi-
navia Insurance Co. (1929) 279 U. S. 405, 408; Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road Co. v. Chatters (1929) 279 U. S. 320, 325.
36 (1917) 243 U. S. 93.
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the facts were the same except that process was served upon an
agent who had been appointed by the corporation for that purpose
in compliance with the state statute. The court held that the
state had jurisdiction on the ground that there was actual con-
sent. The Old Wayne and Simon cases were distinguished on the
ground that in those cases there was no consent.37 But the con-
sent theory is untenable.
In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co. v. Terte,
Judge37a the jurisdiction of a Missouri court over a Kansas cor-
poration was sustained although the cause of action arose in Colo-
rado. The issue is not discussed in the opinion because the cor-
poration relied upon the commerce clause alone to defeat jurisdic-
tion.
The Old Wayne and Simon decisions are based upon the implied
consent doctrine. St. Louis Southwestern Railway v. Alexander,
the earlier case in which the Supreme Court adopted the presence
theory, was not referred to in the Simon case. Now that the
"presence" theory has been adopted the consent and implied con-
sent theories should offer no obstacle to suit on a foreign cause of
action. If the foreign corporate defendant is "present" within
the boundaries of the sovereignty when service is made the juris-
diction thus obtained should extend to all transitory causes of ac-
tion regardless of their origin. In both the Old Wayne and Simon
cases the state statute, pursuant to which service was made upon
a state official, did not require the state official to notify the cor-
poration. Judgments were obtained by default without notice to
the corporation. The obvious unfairness of such procedure un-
doubtedly influenced the court. Due process was not argued or
mentioned in the court's opinion but there are several cases hold-
ing that a statute providing for service upon a public officer but
not requiring the public officer or the plaintiff to notify the cor-
poration is unconstitutional. 38 The Old Wayne and Simon deci-
sions should have been put upon this ground.
3T The same distinction was made in Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading
Coal & Iron Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1915) 222 F. 148, and Bagdon v. Philadel-
phia & Reading Coal & Iron Co. (1916) 217 N. Y. 432, 111 N. E. 1075.
$74 (1932) 284 U. S. 284.
38 King Tonopah Mining Co. v. Lynch (D. C. Nev. 1916) 232 F. 485; Knapp
v. Bullock Tractor Co. (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1917) 242 F. 543. Cf. Wuchter v.
Pizzutti (1928) 276 U. S. 13.
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III. THE TEST OF JURISDICTION
1. DOING BUSINESS.
The United States Supreme Court's test of jurisdiction under
the presence doctrine is the same as it was under the consent doc-
trine. A foreign corporation is subject to a state's jurisdiction
whenever it is doing business within the state's territory. As
previously pointed out, this came about through a misunderstand-
ing of the earlier cases in which the test was the presence of an
agent doing business (i. e. acting) for the corporation. The
change, seemingly immaterial, has proved to be the cause of the
greatest uncertainty and confusion. This is because the phrase
doing business means different things to different judges. Some
limit it to making contracts. Others give it a broader scope.
The result is that the term is warped to suit each judge's notion
of justice and policy. The United States Supreme Court itself
may be found on both sides of every controversial point.
2. ATTEMPTS TO DEFINE.
The United States Supreme Court has from time to time at-
tempted to define doing business. In St. Louis Southwestern
Railway v. Alexander Justice Brandeis said, "In a general way it
may be said that the business must be such in character and extent
as to warrant the inference that the corporation has subjected
itself to the jurisdiction and laws of the district in which it is
served. '3 9  There is nothing definite in this. The lower federal
courts have continued to complain. 40
Justice Day came very close to a solution of the problem in In-
ternational Harvester Co. v. Kentucky when he said, "when a
corporation of one state goes into another in order to be regarded
as within the latter it must be there by its agents authorized to
39 (1913) 227 U. S. 218, 227. For a similar expression see Philadelphia &
Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin (1917) 243 U. S. 264, 265.
40 See Frink Co. v. Erickson (C. C. A. 1, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 707, 711; Farm-
ers' & Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank (D. C. E. D. Ky. 1922) 286
F. 566. In Knapp v. Bullock Tractor Co. (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1917) 242 F. 543 at
p. 549 the court said, "Out of the multitude of authorities cited and which
have been examined by the court in the course of its labors, no really satis-
factory, comprehensive and scientifically accurate determination of what is
necessary, or may be sufficient to constitute 'doing business' in a state has
been encountered."
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol18/iss3/2
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
transact its business in that state."' 41 The adoption of the pres-
ence of an agent or servant acting for the corporation as the test
of jurisdiction is the way out. However, the Supreme Court can-
not be said to have adopted this test because in the subsequent
case of People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.42 they held
that jurisdiction was not acquired by the presence of agents who
were engaged in soliciting, but had no power to contract. Never-
theless Justice Day repeated his formula saying, "The general rule
deducible from all our decisions is that the business must be of
such a nature and character as to warrant the inference that the
corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction, and is by
its duly authorized officers or agents present within the state or
district where service is attempted. '4 3
3. THE TIME ELEMENT
The time element is important in cases where the validity of the
service of process on a foreign corporation is in question. In
Golden, Belknap and Swartz v. Connersville Wheel Co.,44 where
the foreign corporate defendant had completed a contract for the
delivery of motors in the state, two years before suit was filed Dis-
trict Judge Tuttle said:
It must be borne in mind that, in order that proper per-
sonal service may be made in a state upon a foreign corpora-
tion, it is necessary that such corporation be present in such
state at the time of service. As, therefore, the presence of a
foreign corporation is manifested only by its carrying on of
business there it must appear, in such a case, that the foreign
corporation in question was at the very time of the service do-
ing such business in the state where jurisdiction is sought.
It may be difficult, as a matter of fact, for a court to deter-
mine at just what particular moment a corporation begins to
do business in a state, or at what particular instant it ceases
to do such business there. This difficulty, however, is one of
fact. There is no doubt or uncertainty as to the rule of law
applicable. Service cannot be made an instant prior to the
time that the corporation actually begins to do business in the
state, so as to show its presence there. Neither can service
be made an instant after the corporation has ceased to do
such business there. So, in this case, if there is anything
41 (1914) 234 U. S. 579, 583.
42 (1918) 246 U. S. 79. 43 (1918) 246 U. S. 79, 87.44 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1918) 252 F. 904.
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doubtful or hazy about the time when the defendant corpora-
tion ceased to do business in the state of Michigan it is en-
tirely a difficulty of fact.
It may be urged that if, at some prior date, the foreign cor-
poration did, in fact, do business in the state it is a hardship
upon a plaintiff to deprive it of the right to bring suit in the
state on a cause of action growing out of such business. No
different or greater misfortune, however, results to the
plaintiff in such a case than in a case wherein he is seeking
to sue a natural person. If the defendant be such a person
the plaintiff must obtain service while the defendant is per-
sonally within the state in which suit is brought. If he per-
mits the defendant to leave the state before commencing his
action he cannot, of course, obtain personal service so long as
the defendant remains absent from the jurisdiction of the
court.
45
Thus, in effect, the foreign corporation may come and go, enter
and withdraw from a sovereignty's territory.
There are a number of Supreme Court and lower federal court
decisions holding that a foreign corporation is not subject to suit
in a state after it has withdrawn its agents and ceased to do busi-
ness there.45a This is subject to an exception where the statute
specifically provides that foreign corporations doing business in
the state may be sued on causes of action arising in the state after
they had ceased to do business there by serving a state official and
giving notice to the corporation by mail.40b This is because the
corporation was subject to the state's power and the statute ap-
plied to it when the business was done.45c
The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have held that
when a foreign corporation has occasionally transacted business
within a state's territory but is doing no business there at the time
45 (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1918) 252 F. 904, 908.
45a Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Kentucky (1915) 239 U. S.
103; Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Co. (1910) 218 U. S. 573; Mil-
lan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n (C. C. W. D. Va. 1900) 103 F. 764;
Friedman v. Empire Life Insurance Co. (C. C. Ky. 1899) 101 F. 535.
45b Bankers' Surety Co. v. Town of Holly (C. C. A. 8,1915) 219 F. 96; Hardy
v. Ketchum (C. C. A. 8, 1895) 67 F. 282; Western Grocery Co. v. New York
Overseas Co. (D. C. N. D. Cal. 1924) 296 F. 269; Collier v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n (C. C. W. D. Ark. 1902) 119 F. 617. See Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps (1903) 190 U. S. 147. See also cases collected in
note (1926) 45 A. L. R. 1447.
45C See note 27 supra.
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of service jurisdiction is not acquired. 46 If this is so, it would
seem that the foreign corporation would be subject to a state's
jurisdiction when it was transacting business in the state at the
time of service even though that business was but a single and
exceptional transaction. An individual served with process
while temporarily in the state would be subject to'its jurisdiction.
If the test were the presence of an agent acting for the corpora-
tion at the time of service, the courts would have little difficulty in
reaching this result. However, the authorities including deci-
sions of the Supreme Court are divided on the point. In numer-
ous cases where an officer or agent of a foreign corporation has
come into a sovereignty to negotiate the settlement of a claim 4 7
or for other corporate purposes 48 and has been served with proc-
46 Toledo Railways & Light Co. v. Hill (1917) 244 U. S. 49, (office to pay
bond interest maintained five years before suit filed); Hunter v. Mutual Re-
serve Life Insurance Co. (1910) 218 U. S. 573, (several claims adjusted sub-
sequent to the time of service); Kendall v. American Automatic Loom Co.
(1905) 198 U. S. 477 (directors met within the state but had not done so for
three years); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works (1903) 190 U. S. 406 (di-
rectors met within state two or three times but were not meeting at the time
of service) ; Golden, Belknap & Swartz v. Connersville Wheel Co. (D. C. E. D.
Mich. 1918) 252 F. 904 (contract for the delivery of motors completed two
years before); Buffalo Sandstone Brick Co. v. American Sandstone Brick
Machinery Co. (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1905) 141 F. 211 (installation of machin-
ery completed before the time of service) ; Honeyman v. Colorado Fuel & Iron
Co. (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1904) 133 F. 96 (infrequent meetings of directors with-
in the state-no evidence as to when meetings were held).
47 Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis (1908) 213 U. S. 245; Connect-
icut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley (1898) 172 U. S. 602; Premo
Specialty Mfg. Co. v. Jersey-Creme Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1912) 200 F. 352; Dungan
Hood & Co. v. Bally Ltd. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1921) 271 F. 517; Brush Creek Coal
& Mining Co. v. Morgan-Gardner Electric Co. (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1905) 136 F.
505; Houston v. Filer & Stowell Co. (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1898) 85 F. 757.
48 McCord Lumber Co. v. Doyle (C. C. A. 8, 1899) 97 F. 22; Beach v. Kerr
Turbine Co. (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1917) 243 F. 706; Nickerson v. Warren City
Tank & Boiler Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1915) 223 F. 843; New Haven Pulp &
Board Co. v. Downington Mfg. Co. (C. C. Conn. 1904) 130 F. 605. In the
second of these cases Judge Westenhaver said, p. 711, "It is true, we are deal-
ing ,only with a single contract of sale; but the terms thereof required the
foreign corporation to come into the state with its agents and employees and
perform certain acts-in other words to do business." In the third case at
p. 847 the court said, "Its tangible presence here could only be made manifest
in the persons of those who were here acting for it." In the fourth case the
court said, p. 607, "Was the agent in New Haven on business of his corpora-
tion when the papers in this suit were placed in his hands?" and p. 608, "It is
impossible to assent to the proposition that doing business within a state
means a persistent or continuous condition of doing or offering to do business,
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ess while there jurisdiction has been sustained although no other
business was done by the corporation within that sovereignty's
territory. The leading case for this view is Commercial Mutual
Accident Co. v. Davis4 9 where the Supreme Court held that juris-
diction was acquired by serving an agent who came into the state
for the purpose of settling a claim.
A slightly larger number of cases hold that jurisdiction is not
acquired by serving an officer or agent temporarily in the state al-
though he is actively engaged in corporate business at the time of
service. 50  This line of cases originated with a New Jersey case,
usually leading to the appointment of an agent or the establishment of an
office in the state."
49 (1908) 213 U. S. 245.
50 Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Commercial Industrial Co. Ltd. (C. C. A. 9, 1922)
282 F. 21; Duke v. Pioneer Mining & Ditch Co. (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1922) 280
F. 883; Day & Co. v. Schiff, Lang & Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1921) 278 F. 533;
Cody Motors Co. v. Warren Motor Car Co. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1912) 196 F.
254; Noel Construction Co. v. Smith & Co. (C. C. Md. 1911) 193 F. 492; Wil-
kins v. Queen City Savings Bank & Trust Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1907) 154 F.
173; Case v. Smith Lineaweaver & Co. (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1907) 152 F. 730;
Buffalo Glass Co. v. Manufacturers' Glass Co. (C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1905) 142 F.
273; Buffalo Sandstone Brick Co. v. American Sandstone Brick Co.
(C. C. W. D. N. Y. 1905) 141 F. 211; Louden Machinery Co. v. American
Malleable Iron Co. (C. C. S. D. Ia. 1904) 127 F. 1008; United States Graphite
Co. v. Pacific Graphite Co. (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1895) 68 F. 442; Clews v. Wood-
stock Iron Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1890) 44 F. 31; St. Louis Wire-Mill Co. v.
Consolidated Barb Wire Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1887) 32 F. 802; Carpenter v.
Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. (C. C. S. D. Ia. 1887) 32 F. 434; Good Hope Co.
v. Railway Barb Fencing Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884) 22 F. 635.
In Lumiere v. Wilder Inc. (1922) 261 U. S. 174, the president of the foreign
corporate defendant was served with process while he was within the district
but he was not there on business for the corporation. The service was held
invalid. Justice Brandeis said, "That jurisdiction over a corporation cannot
be acquired in a district in which it has no place of business and is not found,
merely by serving process upon an executive officer temporarily therein even
if he is there on business of the company, has been settled." This is pure
dictum. In James Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry (1927) 273 U. S.
119, the jurisdictional question was raised by a plea in abatement and de-
cided on a demurrer to the replication. According to Justice Brandeis's
statement of the case the parties thereby admitted that defendant's president
was in Illinois on corporate business at the time of service and that the cor-
poration had not engaged in or carried on business in the state. It would
seem that if the president was engaged in corporate business in the state the
corporation must have been doing business there. Justice Brandeis said,
"Jurisdiction over a corporation of one state cannot be acquired in another
state or district in which it has no place of business and is not found, merely
by serving process upon an executive officer temporarily therein, even if he is
there on business of the company." If plaintiff admitted that the corporation
was not doing business in Illinois this is pure dictum. If plaintiff made no
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Moulin v. Trenton Mutual Life and Fire Insurance Co.51 where the
foreign corporation's president was served while "accidentally" in
the state. Whether or not he was acting for the corporation
while there cannot be ascertained from the opinion. Until re-
cently the cases were all decisions of the lower federal courts.
They frequently cite the Supreme Court's decisions in St. Clair v.
Cox,52 Goldy v. Morning News,5 3 and Caledonian Coal Co. v.
Baker.54 The point in St. Clair v. Cox was not that the agent was
casually or temporarily in the state, but that it did not appear that
he was acting for the corporation while there. In Goldy v. Morn-
ing News service was on the president while "temporarily" in the
state. In Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker service was on the presi-
dent while "traveling through" the territory of New Mexico. In
neither case does it appear that the officer served was engaged in
corporate business.
Recently the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Rosen-
berg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co.55 The Curtis Brown Co., an Okla-
homa corporation, was a small retail dealer in men's furnishings at
Tulsa. Its president was served with process while purchasing
merchandise for the corporation in New York. Justice Brandeis
said, "Visits on such business, even if occurring at regular in-
tervals, would not warrant the inference that the corporation was
present within the jurisdiction of the state." 6  The Supreme
Court's decision to the contrary in Commercial Mutual Accident
Co. v. Davis57 was not cited. It ought to be a sufficient comment
such admission the statement is applicable. However, with the exception of
Rosenburg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 516, the cases cited for
the statement do not support it.
Where the agent is within the state for the purpose of testifying at a trial
the service is invalid because of privilege. Ladd Metals Co. v. American Min-
ing Co. (C. C. Ore. 1907) 152 F. 1008. Cf. Dungan Hood & Co. v. Bally Ltd.
(D. C. E. D. Pa. 1921) 271 F. 517. The service will be invalid if the agent is
fraudulently induced to enter the state. Stewart v. Nebraska Tire & Rubber
Co. (C. C. A. 8,1930) 39 F. (2d) 309 cert. den. (1931) 282 U. S. 840; Frawley,
Bundy & Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. (C. C. M. D. Pa. 1903) 124 F.
259; William Grace Co. v. Martin Brick Machine Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1909)
174 F. 131.
51 (1853) 24 N. J. L. 222. Same case (1855) 25 N. J. L. (1 Dutch) 57.
52 (1882) 106 U. S. 350.
53 (1894) 156 U. S. 518.
54 (1904) 196 U. S. 432.
5 (1922) 260 U. S. 516.
56 (1922) 260 U. S. 516, 518.
ST (1908) 213 U. S. 245.
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on this case to observe that had the defendant been an individual,
even "a small retail dealer," jurisdiction would be acquired by
personal service in New York.
Statements may be found in some of these cases that single,
isolated or occasional transactions do not constitute such a doing
of business as to subject a foreign corporation to a sovereignty's
jurisdiction and that there must be some substantial business done
or a series of transactions. 58 In cases involving the power of a
state to penalize a foreign corporation for failure to comply with
a statute the Supreme Court has held that a single transaction is
sufficient to subject the corporation to the state's power. This
subject is treated in a subsequent paragraph.5 9
4. THE PART TIME AGENT.
The following propositions applicable to cases involving the
validity of service have been established: (1) Doing business in a
state does not subject a foreign corporation to its jurisdiction if
no business is being done at the time of service.60 (2) The mere
presence of an agent in a state will not subject a foreign corpora-
tion to its jurisdiction if he is not acting for or representing it
while in the state.61 It would seem to follow that where a part
time agent is the only representative of the foreign corporation in
the state, jurisdiction will be acquired by service on the agent
while he is acting for the corporation. If he is not acting for it at
the time of service, jurisdiction will not be acquired. This would
be clearer if the test were the presence of an agent or servant act-
ing for the corporation at the time of service. In cases where a
foreign insurance corporation obtains business through a local
insurance broker or occasionally employs a physician to make an
examination it has been held that jurisdiction was not obtained
58 St. Louis Wire-Mill Co. v. Consolidated Barb Wire Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo.
1887) 32 F. 802, 805 erroneously relying on United States v. American Bell
Telephone Co. (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1886) 29 F. 17; Clews v. Woodstock Iron Co.
(C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1890) 44 F. 31; Louden Machinery Co. v. American Malle-
able Co. (C. C. S. D. Ia. 1904) 127 F. 1008 relyingin part on Cooper Mfg. Co. v.
Ferguson (1885) 113 U. S. '727, in which the court was considering a statute
which authorized service on foreign corporations maintaining an office in the
state and on Doe v. Springfield Boiler & Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1900) 104 F.
684 the point of which was that the person served was not a "business agent"
as required by the statute.
59 Post note 106.
60 Supra notes 44, 45, and 46.
61 Supra note 6.
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by serving the broker 62 or the physician. 63 In these cases the
broker or the physician was not acting for the corporation at the
time of service.64
5. THE CORPORATE AGENT
Will doing business through another corporation subject a for-
eign corporation to a sovereignty's jurisdiction? Here again the
solution of the problem would be easier if the test were the pres-
ence of an agent acting for the corporation at the time of service.
It would then merely be a question of whether or not an agent or
servant of the corporate agent was acting for the foreign corpora-
tion at the time of service.
The first question is whether or not the corporation doing busi-
ness in the state is in fact an agent of the foreign corporation. A
foreign corporation's mere ownership of a controlling interest in
the stock of a subsidiary corporation doing business in the state
will not constitute the subsidiary its agent or subject it to the
state's jurisdiction. 65 Nor will the added circumstance that the
62 Hussey Tie Co. v. Knickerbocker Insurance Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1927) 20 F.
(2d), 892; Doe v. Springfield Boiler & Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 9,1900) 104 F. 684;
Romaine v. Union Insurance Co. (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1893) 55 F. 751. In In re
Hohorst (1893) 150 U. S. 653, service was on the head of a partnership which
was the monetary and fiscal agent of a foreign steamship corporation. It
does not appear whether or not the partnership was also agent for other
steamship companies or whether or not it was acting for the defendant at the
time of service. Held: that the service was valid.
63 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn. (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 40 F.
(2d) 357, reversed on another ground (1931) 283 U. S. 522; Rausch v. Com-
mercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Assn. of America (Q. C. A. 8, 1930) 38
F. (2d) 766, 768 cert. den. (1931) 281 U. S. 763; Higham v. Iowa State
Travelers' Assn. (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1911) 183 F. 845.
64 In Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway (1906) 205 U. S.
364, through trains were operated in Texas by the Gulf Railroad, a Texas
corporation, and in other states by the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rail-
way, an Illinois corporation. The same employees operated the train on both
sides of the Texas border. They received a part of their compensation from
each corporation. It was held that they were the agents of the Gulf Co. while
in Texas and the agents of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway out-
side of Texas and that Texas did not have jurisdiction over the Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Railway.
65 Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works (1903) 190 U. S. 406; Peterson v.
Chicago Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. (1906) 205 U. S. 364, 391; La
Varne v. International Paper Co. (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1929) 37 F. (2d) 141, 144;
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Newton (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1913) 289 F. 1013; United
States v. American Bell Telephone Co. (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1886) 29 F. 17, 37;
People v. American Bell Telephone Co. (1889) 117 N. Y. 241, 22 N. E. 1057.
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subsidiary purchases and distributes the holding company's
products. 66
If the corporation doing business in the state is in fact the agent
of a foreign corporation and is doing business for its principal at
the time it is served jurisdiction over the foreign corporation is
acquired. 67 If it is not doing business for the foreign corpora-
tion at the time of service, jurisdiction is not acquired. 68
6. THE RAILROAD CASES.
There are three types of railroad cases. In the first a foreign
railroad corporation owning no lines and operating no trains in
the sovereignty's territory has executive offices there from which
the operation of the road in other sovereignties is directed. If the
test were the presence of an agent or servant acting for the cor-
poration at the time of service, there could be no question as to the
decision. In Washington-Virginia Railway v. Real Estate Trustof
the Supreme Court sustained jurisdiction. In Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry. Co. v. Weeks 0 they denied a writ of certiorari to a contrary
Circuit Court of Appeals decision. 71
In the second type of case the foreign railroad corporation has
no lines and operates no trains within the sovereignty's bound-
aries, but other railroad companies operating railroads within the
sovereignty's territory sell through transportation a part of
which is over the lines of the foreign railroad corporation in an-
other sovereignty. The cases uniformly hold that the sover-
66 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1925) 267 U. S. 333.
67 Murphy v. Campbell Soup Co. (D. C. Mass. 1930) 40 F. (2d) 671; Cutler
v. Cutler-Hammer Mfg. Co. (D. C. Mass. 1920) 266 F. 388; Dobson v. Farben-
fabriken of Elberfeld Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa. 1913) 206 F. 125. See also Indus-
trial Research Co. v. General Motors Corp. (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1928) 29 F. (2d)
623; Van Dresser v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co. (C. C. Wash. 1891) 48 F. 202;
Newcomb v. New York Central & Hudson River Ry. Co. (1904) 182 Mo. 687,
81 S. W. 1069. Cf. Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank(1923) 261 U. S. 171, criticized in comment (1925) 20 Ill. L. Rev. 281; Bent-
ley Co. v. Chiveris & Sons Ltd. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1913) 215 F. 959.
68 Bank of America v. Whitney Central National Bank (1923) 261 U. S.
171; Frink Co. v. Erikson (C. C. A. 1, 1927) 20 F. (2d), 707; Butler Bros.
Shoe Co. v. United States Rubber Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1907) 156 F. 1; Carpenter
v. Willard Case Lumber Co. (C. C. S. D. Ia. 1908) 158 F. 697; Goepfert v.
Compagnie Generale Transatlantique (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1907) 156 F. 196.
69 (1914) 238 U. S. 185.
70 (1919) 249 U. S. 602.
71 (C. C. A. 5, 1918) 254 F. 513 reversing (D. C. W. D. Tex. 1918) 248 F.
970.
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eignty does not have jurisdiction under these circumstances.7 2
However, the plaintiff in these cases made no showing that the
part time corporate agent was selling transportation over the de-
fendant's lines at the time of service.
In the third type of case the foreign railroad corporation has
no lines and operates no trains within the sovereignty's territory,
but has agents there who devote their full time to inducing ship-
pers to route freight over their lines and prospective passengers
to travel by way of their road. There is a conflict in the authori-
ties as to whether or not the sovereignty has jurisdiction over the
foreign railroad corporation under these circumstances. In
Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 73 the Su-
preme Court held that the sovereignty did not have jurisdiction.
In St. Louis Southwestern Railway v. Alexander74 and Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Co. v. Chatters75 the Supreme Court
reached the opposite result.76 It is submitted that this is the bet-
ter view. Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co.
could not have been decided as it was if the test had been the pres-
ence of an agent or servant acting for the corporation at the time
of service.
This problem is complicated by the limitation imposed upon the
state's jurisdiction by the commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired in states where the
foreign railroad corporation does not operate trains if the cause
of action did not arise within the state because the defense of
72 Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin (1916) 243 U. S. 264;
Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway (1906) 205 U. S. 364;
Allen v. Yellowstone Park Transportation Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1907) 154 F.
504.
73 (1907) 205 U. S. 530. Accord: Fairbank & Co. v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &
T. P. Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1892) 54 F. 420; Griffin v. Seaboard Air Line Rail-
way Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 38 F. (2d) 98; Cancelmo v. Seaboard Air Line
Railway (C. A. of D. C. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 166; Klabzuba v. Southern Pacific Co.
(D. C. W. D. Wash. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 359; Graustein v. Rutland R. Co. (D. C.
Mass. 1919) 256 F. 409; Partola Mfg. Co. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1918) 250 F. 273; West v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co.
(C. C. N. D. 1909) 170 F. 349; McGuire v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (C. C.
N. D. Ia. 1907) 155 F. 230; Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. (C. C. E. D.
Mich. 1888) 34 F. 286.
74 (1912) 227 U. S. 218.
75 (1929) 279 U. S. 320.
76 Accord: Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Roller (C. C. A. 9, 1900) 100 F. 738;
Maverick Mills v. Davis (D. C. Mass. 1923) 294 F. 404; Block v. Atchison
T. & S. F. R. Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1884) 21 F. 529.
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such suits in states where no lines are operated burdens interstate
commerce by requiring the absence of employees from their
posts. 77 This principle applies to suits commenced by attach-
ment as well as to actions in personam.78 It does not apply when
the cause of action arose within the state.79
7. "MERE SOLICITATION"
The notion that mere solicitation did not constitute such a doing
of business as to subject a foreign corporation to a sovereignty's
jurisdiction originated with the Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan in Maxwell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.8o
decided in 1888. In Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rail-
road Co., supra, Justice Moody adopted it saying, "The business
shown in this case was in substance nothing more than that of
solicitation." 8 1
In St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co. v. Alexander a foreign
railroad corporation had an office in New York occupied by a
"General Eastern Freight and Passenger Agent" and a "Travel-
ing Freight Agent," in other words, soliciting agents. The facts
are the same as those in the Green case except that the passenger
agent received a letter from the plaintiff making a claim and re-
plied acknowledging receipt of it and stating that all claims were
handled by the general offices at St. Louis or Tyler, Texas, and
that he letter had been forwarded to the St. Louis office. The Su-
preme Court held that New York had jurisdiction.82
In International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky8 3 the Kentucky
business of a foreign corporation was secured through travelling
salesmen. No offices, agencies or warehouses were maintained in
Kentucky. Orders were filled by shipping into the state from out-
side warehouses. Contracts made by the salesmen were subject
7 Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 312; Michigan Cen-
tral Railroad Co. v. Mix., (1929) 278 U. S. 492; Griffin v. Seaboard Air Line
Railway Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 998, see the same case
(D. C. W. D. Mo. 1930) 38 F. (2d) 98; contra Harris v. American Railway
Express (C. A. of D. C. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 487, cert. den. (1926) 273 U. S. 695.
78 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wells (1924) 265 U. S. 101.
79 St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Railway Co. v. Taylor (1924) 266 U. S.
200.
80 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1888) 34 F. 286.
81 (1907) 205 U. S. 530, 533.
82 (1912) 227 U. .. 218. See also Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v.
Chatters (1929) 279 U. S. 320.
83 (1914) 234 U. S. 579.
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to the approval of the home office, but they had authority to collect
accounts. The Supreme Court held that Kentucky had jurisdic-
tion over the corporation even though all of its business was inter-
state. It was expressly stated that Green v. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railway was not overruled so that the decision appar-
ently rests on the fact that the salesmen had authority to make col-
lections. Thus Justice Moody's statement in the Green case was
revived after the Green case itself had apparently been laid to rest
by the contra decision in St. Louis Southwestern Railway v.
Alexander.
In Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co.84 a foreign corporation main-
tained an office in New York for eleven sales agents who had no
authority finally to approve contracts. The New York Court of
Appeals in an opinion by Judge Cardozo held that New York had
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation although the agents had
no authority to make collections as had the agents in the Interna-
tional Harvester Co. case. It refused to apply the Green case.
In spite of these decisions, the Supreme Court in People's To-
bacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co.8 5 held that Louisiana did not
have jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which had agents
soliciting business in the state who had no authority finally to ap-
prove contracts.
The efforts of the lower federal courts to apply these cases
have led to some peculiar results. Several courts thought that
the sovereignty should have jurisdiction as to causes of action
arising out of the solicitation, but held that there was no jurisdic-
tion as to causes of action not arising out of the solicitation.8 6 In
one case a foreign corporation had a resident mechanic in Ohio
who travelled about the state servicing machines sold by it. It
also employed travelling solicitors without power to conclude con-
tracts who sold the machines. The court held that Ohio had jur-
isdiction over the corporation because the acts of the mechanic
amounted to "doing business" but that the solicitation by the
salesmen was not "doing business. ' '87 One court applied the doc-
84 (1917) 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915. See also Laurentide Co. Ltd. v.
Durey (D. C. N. D. N. Y. 1916) 231 F. 223.
85 (1918) 246 U. S. 79.
8 Brown v. Shields & Co. (D. C. Mass. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 542; Strain v. Chi-
cago Portrait Co. (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1903) 126 F. 831.
87 Cone v. New Britain Machine Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 593 cert.
den. (1927) 275 U. S. 552. Cf. Fawkes v. American Motor Car Sales Co.
(C. C. Minn. 1910) 176 F. 1010.
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trine to a purchasing agent whose purchases were subject to the
approval of the home office.88
There are cases sustaining jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion based on the presence of an agent with authority to conclude
contracts. 89 The fact that the agent had authority to make con-
tracts was emphasized, but this was because service was made on
the agent and the question was whether or not the agent was a
proper person to serve under the statute. In one case it was held
that the agent did not come within the class designated by the
statute.90
It is submitted that the mere solicitation rule is unsound. In
cases where the question is whether a foreign corporation is sub-
ject to a penalty for failure to comply with a statute requiring
foreign corporations to file a copy of their articles of incorpora-
tion and pay a fee etc. before doing business within the sover-
eignty a single act of solicitation by an agent is held sufficient to
subject the foreign corporation to the sovereignty's jurisdiction.0 '
In a case of this type decided in 1927 Justice Brandeis said, "But
the company, a foreign corporation, had no constitutional right to
solicit the insurance in Minnesota by means of an agent present
within that State. For the act of solicitation there the State
might have punished the agent; and also the Company as prin-
cipal." 92 The jurisdictional problem in this type of case is the
same as in cases involving the validity of service.
Certainly the term "doing business" includes more than the
mere making of contracts. Collecting money is not contracting
8 8 Johanson v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co. (D. C. W. D. Wash. 1915)
225 F. 270. Cf. Meade Fibre Co. v. Varn (C. C. A. 4, 1925) 3 F. (2d) 520.
89 Sales agents: Palmer v. Chicago Herald Co. (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1895) 70
F. 886; Brewer v. Geo. Knapp & Co. (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1897) 82 F. 694; Irons
v. Rogers (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908) 166 F. 781; Michigan Aluminum Foundry
Co. v. Aluminum Castings Co. (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1911) 190 F. 879. Purchas-
ing agents: Hunan v. Northern Region Supply Corp. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920)
262 F. 181. In Rosenburg Co. v. Curtis Brown Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 516, the
presence of the president of a foreign corporation in New York actively en-
gaged in making purchases was held not to subject the foreign corporation to
New York's jurisdiction but the ground was that he was only "temporarily"
there. The case is contra to many others cited in notes 47 and 48 supra and
note 106 post.
9o Boardman v. S. S. McClure Co. (C. C. Minn. 1903) 123 F. 614,
91 Chattanooga National Building & Loan Assn. v. Denson (1903) 189
U. S. 408.92 Bothwell v. Buckbee Mears Co. (1927) 275 U. S. 274.
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yet in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky 93 it was held to be
doing business so as to subject the corporation to Kentucky's
jurisdiction. There are cases holding that the performance of
contracts constitutes doing business. 94
Under the proposed rule the corporation is present while the
agent or servant is present and acting for it. The presence of any
agent or servant while acting for the corporation in any capacity
no matter how humble is equivalent to corporate presence. The -
extent of the agent's or servant's authority is immaterial.
8. BUSINESS BY MAIL, TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
In Minnesota Commercial Men's Association v. Benn95 an in-
surance corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota
where its only office was located insured residents of Montana.
The business was carried on entirely by mail. The company ad-
vertised in Montana. Prospective members applied for insur-
ance by filling out and mailing application blanks supplied by the
company. Policies were mailed to approved risks. The policy
holders mailed their premiums to the office in Minnesota. Claims
were adjusted upon proofs of loss including an attending physi-
cian's certificate mailed to the company upon blanks furnished by
it. The Supreme Court held that the corporation was not doing
business in Montana because the contracts were made in Minne-
sota. Other courts have reached the sanro result.9
There are also a number of cases holding that a foreign corpora-
tion is not doing business in a state after it revokes the authority
of its agents and ceases to seek new business there although it
continues to collect premiums on existing policies.97 Several fed-
93 (1912) 234 U. S. 579.
94 Cone v. New Britain Machine Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 593 cert.
den. (1927) 275 U. S. 552; Beach v. Kerr Turbine Co., (D. C. M. D. Ohio 1917)
243 F. 706; Nickerson v. Warren City Tank & Boiler Co. (D. C. E. D. Pa.
1915) 223 F. 843.
95 (1922) 261 U. S. 140.
96 Tomlinson v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1918)
251 F. 171; Frawley, Bundy & Wilcox v. Pennsylvania Casualty Co. (C. C.
M. D. Pa. 1903) 124 F. 259; Pembleton v. Illinois Commercial Men's Assn.
(1919) 289 Ill. 99, 124 N. E. 355. See also Hazeltine v. Mississippi Valley
Fire Insurance Co. (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1893) 55 F. 743.
97 Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Kentucky (1915) 239 U. S.
103; Hunter v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Co. (1910) 218 U. S. 573; Mil-
]an v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. (C. C. W. D. Va. 1900) 103 F. 764;
Friedman v. Empire Life Insurance Co. (C. C. Ky. 1899) 101 F. 535. See also
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eral courts have held that making sales by mail, telephone and
telegraph and shipping merchandise direct to purchasers in the
state is not doing business there.98 These decisions were not
based on the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
Foreign corporations may be sued in a state in which they are do-
ing business although all of that business is interstate.99
However, if the foreign corporation has an agent in the state
conducting its affairs' 00 or negotiating the settlement of a
claim' 0' or a physician making an examination, 02 it is held to be
"doing business" even though most of its business is done by mail.
The Supreme Court seems to be unduly narrowing the meaning
of the word business when it declares advertising, the delivery of
insurance policies, and the payment of claims not to be doing busi-
Swann v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. (C. C. Ky. 1900) 100 F. 922;
Compagnie Du Port De Rio De Janeiro v. Mead Morrison Mfg. Co. (D. C. Me.
1927) 19 F. (2d) 163. Contra: Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Tuch-
feld (C. C. A. 6,1908) 159 F. 833. In Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Spratley (1898) 172 U. S. 602, and Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v.
Phelps (1903) 190 U. S. 147, the Supreme Court said that collecting pre-
miums by mail was "doing business" which subjected the foreign insurance
company to the state's jurisdiction, but in both cases there was service on an
agent of the corporation who at the time was acting for it within the state.
Chehalis River Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Empire State Surety Co. (D. C. W. D.
Wash. 1913) 206 F. 559 is apparently contra but the problem is regarded as
solely one of statutory construction.
98 S. B. McMaster v. Chevrolet Motor Co. Inc. (D. C. E. D. S. C. 1925) 3
F. (2d) 469; Gottschalk Co. v. Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. (C. C. Md.
1892) 50 F. 681.
99 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky (1914) 234 U. S. 579.
100 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. v. Phelps (1903) 190 U. S. 147; Inter-
national Text Book Co. v. Pigg (1910) 217 U. S. 91; Board of Trade v. Ham-
mond Elevator Co. (1904) 198 U. S. 424; Midland Linseed Products Co. v.
Warren Bros. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1925) 46 F. (2d) 870; Wilson v. Hudson Motor
Car Co. (D. C. Neb. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 347; Frey & Son Inc. v. Cudahy Packing
Co. (D. C. Md. 1915) 228 F. 209.
'
0oConnecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley (1898) 172 U. S. 602;
Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer (1905) 197
U. S. 407; Birch v. Mutual Reserve Life Insurance Co. (1904) 91 App. Div.
384, 86 N. Y. S. 872, aff'd 181 N. Y. 583, 200 U. S. 612.
102 Commercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, (1908) 213 U. S. 245. The
cases of Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Assn., (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 40
F. (2d), 357 reversed on another ground (1931) 283 U. S. 522; Rausch v. Com-
mercial Travelers' Mutual Accident Assn. of America (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 38
F. (2d) 766, 768 cert. den. (1930) 281 U. S. 763; Higham v. Iowa State Trav-
elers' Assn. (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1911) 183 F. 845 are only apparently contra for
they are all cases involving the validity of service where the summons was
served upon the physician at a time when he was not acting for the cor-
poration.
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ness. Truth and accuracy would be better served if it reached the
same result on the ground that the corporation had no agent in the
state.
IV. JURISDICTION TO PENALIZE FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
STATUTE
Most sovereignties have statutes which require foreign cor-
porations to do certain things, such as file a copy of their articles
of incorporation, pay a fee, and appoint a local agent to receive
service of process, before doing business in their territory. The
statute usually imposes some kind of penalty for non-compliance
with its requirements. 1 3  In cases where it is sought to impose
this penalty upon a foreign corporation the first question is
whether or not it was within the sovereignty's jurisdiction for, of
course, if it was not the statute does not apply to it. The time ele-
ment is unimportant in this type of case. 04 The penalty attaches
at the time the corporation does the act within the state in viola-
tion of the statute.1 5 A single act or transaction will subject the
corporation to the sovereignty's jurisdiction and the statutory
103 There is a conflict in authority as to whether contracts made within the
sovereignty in violation of a statute which imposes no penalty are void. The
better view is that they are valid. Boatmen's Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen
(C. C. A. 8, 1915) 221 F. 154, 160 cert. den. (1915) 238 U. S. 641; Blodgett v.
Lanyon Zinc Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1903) 120 F. 893; Northwestern Mutual Life In-
surance Co. v. Overhold (C. C. Colo. 1878) 18 Fed. Cas. 403. Contra: Cy-
clone Mining Co. v. Baker Light & Power Co. (C. C. Ore. 1908) 165 F. 996;
Semple v. Bank of British Columbia (C. C. Ore. 1878) 21 Fed. Cas. 1063; In
re Comstock (D. C. Ore. 1874) 6 Fed. Cas. 244.
104 In In re Monongahela Distillery Co. (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1910) 186 F. 220
the court failed to notice this distinction between the two types of cases. A
foreign corporation sold merchandise through a factor located in Michigan
without complying with the Michigan statute. The factor became a bank-
rupt and the failure to comply with the statute was offered as an objection
to the allowance of the foreign corporation's petition to reclaim goods. Judge
Dennison said that the contracts of sale made by the factor were in law the
contracts of the consignor and that it would seem that the corporation was do-
ing business in the state. However, he felt bound by Butler Bros. Shoe Co.
v. U. S. Rubber Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1907) 156 F. 1 cert. den. (1907) 212 U. S. 577,
a case involving the validity of service upon the foreign corporation by serv-
ing its local factor in which there was no evidence that the factor was acting
for the foreign corporation at the time of service. He therefore held that the
corporation was not doing business in Michigan and that Michigan did not
have jurisdiction.
105 Loomis v. People's Construction Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1914) 211 F. 453 and
cases cited in note 106.
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penalty.10 6 There are numerous dicta to the effect that single or
occasional transactions will not subject the foreign corporation to
a sovereignty's jurisdiction. 01 These originated with Cooper
Manufacturing Co. v. Ferguson s08 where the statute required for-
eign corporations to maintain an office within the state. It would
be unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended that this
type of statute apply to occasional transactions. 0 9 The expense of
maintaining an office would be too great in proportion to the busi-
ness done. The state has jurisdiction, but the statute does not
apply.
There are other non-jurisdictional reasons why the statute may
not apply. In the United States the business which is done with-
106 Chattanooga National Building & Loan Assn. v. Denson (1903) 189
U. S. 408; Interstate Amusement Co. v. Albert (1916) 239 U. S. 560; Kansas
City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas (1925) 269 U. S. 148; Bothwell v.
Buckbee Mears Co. (1927) 275 U. S. 274; Oakland Sugar Mill Co. v. Fred
W. Wolfe Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1902) 118 F. 239. Contra: Empire Milling &
Mining Co. v. Tombstone Mill & Mining Co. (C. C. Conn. 1900) 100 F. 910.
In Phillips Co. v. Everett (C. C. A. 6, 1919) 262 F. 341 cert. den. (1920)
252 U. S. 579, a foreign corporation contracted to install a sprinkler system
in a Michigan factory. The work was done and the material furnished by
independent subcontractors, but the foreign corporation as general contractor
exercised geneial supervision over the work. The court held that Michigan
had jurisdiction over the foreign corporation on the ground that for this pur-
pose the subcontractors could not be considered as independent contractors.
It does not appear that the foreign corporation had agents in Michigan, but
since it is difficult to see how it could exercise general supervision without
having agents there to inspect the work the case can probably be supported
on this ground. In Toledo Traction Light & Power Co. v. Smith (D. C. N. D.
Ohio 1913) 205 F. 643 it was held that a Maine corporation owning a ma-
jority of the stock of an Ohio corporation did not subject itself to Ohio's
jurisdiction by voting the stock. It does not appear where the meetings were
held but as they probably were held in Ohio the soundness of the decision may
well be doubted. Decisions to the effect that the mere holding of stock in a
domestic corporation will not subject a foreign corporation to a sovereignty's
jurisdiction are not authority for this decision.
107 Ammons v. Brunswick-Balke Collender Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1905) 141 F.
570 decided on this ground although the transaction was interstate; Kirven
v. Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. (C. C. A. 4, 1906) 145 F. 288; Bruner v.
Kansas Moline Plow Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1909) 168 F. 218 decided on this ground
although the transaction was interstate; Natural Carbon Point Co. v. Bredel
Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1911) 193 F. 897; Vulcan Steam Shovel Co. v. Flanders
(D. C. E. D. Mich. 1913) 205 F. 102.
108 (1885) 113 U. S. 727.
109 Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. v. Mahlenbrock (1899) 63 N. J. Law 281.
But even this type of statute has been interpreted to apply to single or occa-
sional transactions. Chattanooga National Building & Loan Assn. v. Denson
(1903) 189 U. S. 408.
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in a state's territory may be interstate or foreign commerce. The
state has jurisdiction over foreign corporations whose business
within its territory is solely of this character for the corporation
can be sued there, and statutes requiring the appointment of a
local agent to receive service of process are not contrary to the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 110 However,
interstate and foreign commerce is burdened by statutes requiring
the payment of a fee or the filing of articles of incorporation.1 1
A provision penalizing foreign corporations Violating the
statute by making its contracts void or unenforceable is com-
mon. 112 A provision voiding such contracts does not apply to
those made outside the sovereignty's territory" 3 or creating or
transferring an interest in land situated beyond its borders." 4
This is because of the conflict of laws rule that the essential valid-
ity of a contract depends upon the law of the place where the con-
tract is made 115 unless an interest in land is created or transfer-
red, in which case the law of the place where the land is situated
governs. 16 However, a sovereignty's courts may refuse to en-
I10 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky (1914) 234 U. S. 579.
1? International Text Book Co. v. Pigg (1910) 217 U. S. 91; Star Chronicle
Publishing Co. v. United Press Assn. (C. C. A. 8, 1913) 204 F. 217; Parsons-
Willis Lumber Co. v. Stuart (C. C. A. 5, 1910) 182 F. 779; Atlas Engine
Works v. Parkinson (D. C. W. D. Wis. 1908) 161 F. 223.
112 Statutes which provide for a fine or other penalty, but do not mention
contracts are interpreted not to affect their validity. Fritts v. Palmer (1889)
132 U. S. 282. Cf. note 103 supra. Some statutes contain specific provisions
to this effect. Iowa Lillooet Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co. (C. C. N. D. Ia. 1906) 146 F. 437.
113 Langenkamp v. Broscala Chemical Co. (D. C. S. D. Ohio 1927) 21 F.
(2d) 207, reversed (C. C. A. 6, 1929) 32 F. (2d) 725 on the ground that the
contract was not made in Indiana but in Ohio. Contra: In re Conecuh Pine
Lumber & Mfg. Co., (D. C. M. D. Ala. 1910) 180 F. 249; A. H. Andrews Co. v.
Colonial Theatre Co. (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1922) 283 F. 471 both cases erroneous-
iy applying Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co. (1903) 187 U. S. 611.
Cases holding a contract made within the sovereignty void are: Midland
Linseed Products Co. v. Warren Bros. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1925) 46 F. (2d) 870;
County of Cullman, Ala. v. Vincennes Bridge Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1918) 251 F.
473; Loomis v. People's Construction Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1914) 211 F. 453. See
Chattanooga National Building & Loan Assn. v. Denson (1903) 189 U. S. 408.
"14 Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co. (1919) 252 U. S. 499, 503. Contra:
George v. Oscar Smith & Sons Co. (C. C. A. 5,1918) .250 F. 41.
115 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Clements (1891) 140 U. S. 226;
New York Life Insurance Co. v. Cravens (1900) 178 U. S. 389. Other rules
find support in the authorities. See Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, (1927) p.
228.
1
6 Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, (1927) p. 333.
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force a contract made elsewhere if secured through the activities
of a local agent or performance is attempted within its territory
in violation of the statute.117 This is because the enforcement of
the valid contract would be contrary to the sovereignty's policy
announced in the statute.
If the statute merely provides that the foreign corporation fail-
ing to comply therewith shall not maintain any action upon its
contracts they are not void, but merely unenforceable in the sov-
ereignty's courts. 1 8 They may be enforced after the statute
has been repealed" 9 or complied with.20 State statutes of this
type do not prohibit suit in the federal courts in the state. 21
V. CONCLUSION
A sovereignty's legislative, executive and judicial power is,
with the exception of citizens located abroad, limited to persons
and property within its own territory. The application of this
principle to corporations is difficult because corporations are in-
tangible entities which have no location in space. This difficulty
may be overcome by regarding the corporation as present wher-
ever its agents and servants are acting for it. Thus a foreign
corporation may be said to be subject to a sovereignty's jurisdic-
27 Bothwell v. Buckbee Mears Co. (1927) 275 U. S. 274. See the same
case (1926) 166 Minn. 285, 207 N. W. 724. The same is true where the con-
tract was made prior to the enactment of the statute and the foreign corpora-
tion attempts performance within the sovereignty's territory. Such a re-
fusal to enforce the contract is not unconstitutional as impairing the obliga-
tions of contract. Diamond Glue Co. v. U. S. Glue Co. (1903) 187 U. S. 611.
118 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile Club of America (1912) 225
U. S. 489; Brace v. Granger-Korsmo Construction Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 36 F.
(2d) 661, 663 cert. den. (1930) 281 U. S. 738; Louis Ilfeld Co. v. Union Pa-
cific Ry. Co. (C. C. A. 8,1927) 23 F. (2d) 65 cert. den. (1928) 276 U. S. 635;
Republic Creosoting Co. v. Boldt Construction Co. (C. C. A. 6,1930) 38 F. (2d)
739; Kawin & Co. v. American Colortype Co. (C. C. A. 7, 1917) 243 F. 317;
Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Corey Bros. Construction
Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1913) 208 F. 976; Dunlop v. Mercer (C. C. A. 8, 1907) 156 F.
545; Colby v. Cleaver (C. C. Ida. 1908) 169 F. 206; Groton Bridge & Mfg. Co.
v. American Bridge Co., (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1907) 151 F. 871. No federal
question is presented by a state court's interpretation of a statute as either
void or merely unenforceable. The state court's interpretation will be fol-
lowed by the federal courts. Allen v. Allegheny Co. (1905) 196 U. S. 458;
Swing v. Weston Lumber Co. (1907) 205 U. S. 275.
119 Boatmen's Bank of St. Louis v. Fritzlen (C. C. A. 8, 1915) 221 F. 154,
160 cert. den. (1915) 238 U. S. 641.
l2b Johnson v. New York Breweries Co. (C. C. A. 2, 1910) 178 F. 513.
121 All cases cited in note 118 except Dunlop v. Mercer.
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tion whenever one or more of its agents or servants acting in its
behalf is within that sovereignty's territory. This is not a new
idea. The first decisions of the United States Supreme Court
were based upon it. The question in these cases was whether or
not jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was acquired by serv-
ice upon one of its agents within the state. The Supreme Court
held that jurisdiction was acquired but that it must appear that
the agent was acting or doing business for the corporation, that
is, that he must be acting in a representative capacity. Later
cases adopted the phrase "doing business" as the test of jurisdic-
tion thus obscuring the real basis of the earlier decisions. The idea
that jurisdiction depends upon the presence of an agent acting
for the corporation again apears in Justice Day's language in
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky where he said "when a
corporation of one state goes into another in order to be regarded
as within the latter it must be there by its agents authorized to
transact its business in that state." 122
The adoption of the presence of an agent or servant acting for
the corporation as the test of jurisdiction would effect no revolu-
tion. The authorities would be undisturbed except that the Su-
preme Court would be obliged to take a definite stand upon those
issues upon which its own decisions now conflict. The "mere
solicitation" rule should be abandoned. St. Louis Southwestern
Railway Co. v. Alexander 123 and International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky 124 should be followed. Green v. Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad Co.1 2 5 and People's Tobacco Co. v. American
Tobacco Co.12 0 should be overruled. The Supreme Court should
recognize that in service cases the question is not only whether or
not the foreign corporation was doing business in the state
through an agent, but also whether or not it was transacting busi-
ness there at the time of service. Cases holding that jurisdiction
was not acquired although the corporation had transacted some
business in the state at a time prior to service ought not to be ex-
plained on the ground that the transactions were merely isolated
or occasional. The recent cases, Rosenburg Co. v. Curtis Brown
Co.' 2 T and James Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry,128 hold-
122 Supra note 41. 126 Supra note 85.
123 Supra note 82. 127 Supra notes 55 and 50.
124 Supra note 83. 128 Supra note 50.
125 Supra notes 81 and 73.
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ing that "Jurisdiction over a corporation of one state cannot be
acquired in another state or district in which it has no place of
business and is not found merely by serving process upon an
executive officer temporarily therein even if he is there on busi-
ness of the company" should be overruled and Commercial Mutual
Accident Co. v. Davis129 should be followed.
These changes are desirable in the interest of certainty and
predictability. It is true that justice ought not be sacrificed in any
considerable degree to obtain certainty and predictability, but
considerations of justice are not involved. The question is one of
power and the only policy involved is that which lies behind the
general principle limiting a state's power to persons and property
within its own territory.
329 Supra note 49. See also notes 47 and 48.
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